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BIBLE READING IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Schemyp v. School District of lbitzgton Townshp
177 F. Sutpp. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1959)
Plaintiffs, as parents and members of the Unitarian faith, sued to
enjoin compliance with a Pennsylvania statute requiring daily reading in
the public schools of at least ten verses of the "Holy Bible" without com-
ment' and also to halt the practice of accompanying the reading with mass
recitation of the Lord's Prayer. The plaintiff's children were compelled
to participate in these "devotions." The three-judge district court held
this program unconstitutional2 because compulsion to participate was a
violation of the pupils' right to free exercise of religion. Furthermore the
statute effected the establishment of religion insofar as the practice aided
the Christian religion in particular and religion in general by direct re-
minder of man's relation to God.'
The constitutionality of the practice of Bible reading in public schools
has never been tested on the merits by the United States Supreme Court,4
although there are decisions relating to the validity of released time pro-
grams encouraging religion generally.5 Bible reading in public schools,
often accompanied with some additional devotional practice such as prayer
recitation or hymn singing, is a common practice, permitted by most states
and even required by some.6 Validity of the practice is generally sustained
on the theory that the Bible is non-sectarian7 and unobjectionable to a be-
liever in God.8 A minority of the state courts,9 however, have condemned
124 PA. STAT. 15-1516 (1949).
2 177 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
3 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishme'. of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I, made applicable
to the states by U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
4 Doremus v. Board of Educ., 5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880 (1950), app. dism'd.
342 U.S. 429 (1950).
5 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1951); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board
of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1947).
6 See ALA. CODE tit. 52, §§ 542-44 (1940); ARK. STAT. § 80-1606 (1947) ; DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 758 (1953); FLA. STAT. § 231.09 (2) (1953); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 32-705 (1936); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-2705 (1947); Ky. REV. STAT. § 158.170
(1948); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 37, § 127 (1944); MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 71, § 31
(1945); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:14-77 (1940); PA. STAT. tit. 24, §§ 1555-56 (1936);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 2343 (4) (Williams 1934).
7But See 177 F. Supp. 398 at 401-2; Gerhardt v. Heid, 66 N.D. 444, 267 N.W.
127 (1936).
S People v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 Pac. 610 (1927); Wilkerson v. City of
Rome, 152 Ga. App. 762, 107 S.E. 47 (1921) ; Billard v. Board of Educ., 69 Kan.
53, 76 Pac. 422 (1904) ; Hackett v. Brooksville School District, 120 Ky. 608,
87 S.W. 792 (1905); Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 376 (1854); Spiller v. Woburn,
94 Mass. 127 (1866); Kaplan v. Independent School District, 171 Minn. 142, 214
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such practices as state establishment of religion contrary to the first amend-
ment.
10
The Supreme Court has never adopted any particular test with ref-
erence to Jefferson's "wall of separation"" even though secularization
of public education has generally become "firmly established in the con-
sciousness of the nation."' 2 An extreme approach suggested by a minority
of the Court would require a complete divorce of state and religion; any
program which fosters cooperation or mutual aid between the two is ob-
jectionable regardless of its operation. 3 On the other hand, the "wall", ac-
cording to the prevailing historical analysis, does not prohibit incidental
state aid to religion' 4 so long as the state does not directly promote re-
ligious dogma.' 5 The constitutionality of a program of cooperation be-
tween church and state depends on a particularized consideration of the
facts of each case. 16
Of primary importance in the process of fact evaluation is con-
N.W. 18 (1927); Doremus v. Board of Educ., supra note 4; Church v. Bullock,
104" Tex. 1, 109 S.W. 115 (1908).
9People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Educ., 245 Ill. 334, 92 N.E. 251 (1910);
Herold v. Parish Board, 136 La. 1034, 68 So. 116 (1915); Freeman v. Scheve, 65
Neb. 853, 93 N.W. 169 (1902); State ex rel. Weiss v. District Board, 76 Wis.
177, 44 N.W. 967 (1890).
10 See Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 742 (1956).
11Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
12 See Frankfurter, J., McCollum v. Board of Educ., supra note 5; Rutledge,
J., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
13 "In considering whether a state has entered this forbidden field (state aid
to religion) the question is not whether it has entered too far but whether it has
entered at all." Black, J., dissenting in Zorach v. Clauson, supra note 5 at 318:
"The effect of the religious freedom amendment to our Constitution was to take
every form of propagation of religion out of the realm of things which could
directly or indirectly be made public business . . ." Jackson, J., dissenting in
Everson v. Board of Educ., supra note 12 at 26 with Frankfurter, J., concurring
in the dissent.
"(The first amendment's purpose) was to create a complete and permanent separa-
tion of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively
forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion." Rutledge, J., dis-
senting in Everson v. Board of Educ., supra note 12 at 32.
14 For example, the universally permitted property tax exemption for churches.
15 Zorach v. Clauson, supra note 5 at 308; Everson v. Board of Educ., supra
note 12.
16 KONVITZ, FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES OF A FREE PEOPLE, Ch. 9 (1957) ; PFEFFER,
CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM, 386-91 (1951); Howe, Religion and Race in Pub-
lic Education, BUFFALO LAW REv. 24247 (1959) ; Meiklejohn, Education Coopera-
tion Between Church and State: The First Freedom, 14 LAW AND CON-
TEMPORARY PROBLEMS 44-112 (1949); Pfeffer and O'Neill, The Meaning of the
Establishment Clause-A Debate, 2 BUFFALO LAW REv. 225 (1953); Snee, Relig-
ious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 371;
Sutherland, Due Process and Disestablishment, 62 HARv, L. REV. 1306 (1949) ;
Waite, Jefferson's "Wall of Separation": What and Where', 33 MINN. L. REV.
494 (1947).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
sideration of the extent of support of religious dogma. If the practice sup-
ports any particular religion to the exclusion of others, as in Schemrp,
there is unconstitutional state aid. 7 It is at this point that the portion or
version of the Bible used becomes significant. Use of the New Testament
is objectional to the Jews, but to confine examination to the Old
Testament tends to favor them. In addition, the King James version of
the Bible is unacceptable to Catholics.'" Addition to the Bible reading of
such practices as recitation of the Lord's Prayer can be tantamount to a
religious service in view of the devotional attitude typically attending
prayer. The incidence of devotional practices determines whether the
program of the school is instruction about religion or whether it is dis-
cipline in dogma.
Secondly, compulsory participation in any religious program, al-
though itself an independent ground for unconstitutionality, contributes
to the conclusion that the state aid amounts to establishment. Although
overt acts of compulsion are dealt with effectively by the free exercise
clause of the first amendment, the subtle compulsion on children to con-
form to the practices of their schoolmates is equally suppressive since "non-
conformity is not an outstanding characteristic of children."' 9 The older
Schempp boy, in this case, was expressly compelled by the principal to par-
ticipate in the "devotions" but the younger Schempp child was equally
coerced by desire to conform. Similar use of the state authority to draft
children into a religious, program has been held constitutionally objection-
able.
2 0
Thirdly, the greater the extent of economic support to religion by
the direct disbursement of public tax funds, the more likely it is that
there will be prohibited state establishment.2 In Schempp, the classroom
facilities and the teachers' salaries were provided at public expense. Use
of classrooms in McCollum and the absence of use of any public facili-
ties in Zorach were distinguishing features which contributed to opposite
results on otherwise similar released time programs.
22
Religion in the public schools is an area where fine distinctions are
to be expected so that characterization of facts becomes all-important. 23
Furthermore, the courts will use common sense rather than abstract doc-
trine to determine whether the public support of religion is so direct as to
17 See Jackson, J., McCollum v. Board of Educ., supra note 5; Everson v.
Board of Educ., supra note 12 at 15-16.
18177 F. Supp. 398 at 401-2; Tudor v. Board of Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 100 A.2d
857 (1953); cert. denied, 348 U.S. 816 (1954).
19 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., supra note 5 at 227.
20 West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). But see Zorach v. Clauson,
supra note 5.
21But see Everson v. Board of Educ., supra note 12.
22 See facts of Zorach v. Clauson, supra note 5, and Illinois ex rel McCollum
v. Board of Educ., supra note 5.
23 Supra note 22.
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be objectionable.24 The Bible reading in this case, disregarding the issues
of sectarian discrimination and free exercise, might have been permissible
had it not been accompanied by recitation of the Lord's Prayer so as to
make the practice essentially devotional. The simple answer is that the
Schempp case extends no further than its facts. The harder problem is to
discover what increments or features of public support will condemn a
program as prohibited state aid to religion.
Riahard Augenbaugh
2 4 KoNvrrz, FUNDAMENTAL LERTIES OF A FREE PEOPLE, supra note 16.
